A. Introduction -A Legal Perspective
The EU pursues a policy of promoting the rule of law. This applies not only within the EU -regarding its own Member States 1 and in the course of EU accession procedures 2 -but also with respect to legal orders beyond the EU's own (future) territory and jurisdiction.
For this policy of promoting the rule of law aboard, the EU employs a variety of instruments.
3 However, as the globally leading entity in development cooperation 4 and one of the world's largest trading powers, 5 the EU is particularly well-positioned to pursue the policy of exporting values, such as the rule of law, The EU-28 accounts for around 15 % of the world's trade in goods. In 2016 the EU-28 had the highest level of trade in goods (imports and exports) exceeding those of the US or China, see Eurostat, International Trade in Goods (2017), 1, available at http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1188.pdf (last visited 13 December 2018).
through the medium of its foreign trade and development policies. 6 A clear indication of such policy conception can be observed in the EU's recent 2017 New European Consensus on Development which states:
"The EU and its Member States will promote the universal values of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights for all, because they are preconditions for sustainable development and stability, across the full range of partnerships and instruments in all situations and in all countries, including through development action." 7 It is this rule of law promotion policy, in the so-called foreign trade and development nexus, that shall form the general backdrop of this article -with the 'foreign trade and development nexus' in this context to be understood as the entirety of the EU's international action (uni-, bi-and multilateral) in the closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing fields of trade liberalization and development cooperation (after all, many of the EU's trade activities are not only conducted for the economic benefit of the Union but also for the development benefit of the respective partner States). 8 In light of the specific topic of this GoJIL Special Issue, the article will approach the above-described general field of EU rule of law promotion in the foreign trade and development nexus from a particular analytical perspective -namely a legal perspective. 9 With this perspective, the article focuses not only on understanding which positive legal norms impel and drive the EU to promote the rule of law abroad, but also on exploring what legal instruments and mechanisms employed by the EU govern and organize the actual promotion and transfer processes. Consequently, the assessment aims to emphasize the law's relevance in what often rather seems to consist of a sequence of decisions and aspirations in a predominantly socio-political sphere.
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With the aim of contributing to a better understanding of what might, therefore, be described as the law behind rule of law transfers, the article will proceed in two steps.
First, the article will deal with the EU's internal legal imperatives with respect to the promotion of the rule of law in the EU's foreign policy (B.). Within this part, it will be assessed why a certain detachment of foreign policies from legal determination and control, typically to be observed in western constitutional democracies, does not hold true for the EU (I.), to what extent the EU is actually legally obliged to promote the rule of law in foreign policy
With this article's specific focus on the assessment of these legal dimensions of the EU's rule of law promotion, other issues, notwithstanding how related they may appear, shall not be discussed. In particular, such issues would not include the legitimacy ('legal imperialism'), overall effectiveness, or coherence of the EU's approach. See on these issues e.g. R. Brooks, 'The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the "Rule of Law (II.), and, subsequently, what concept of the rule of law the EU applies when promoting it abroad (III.).
Based on these findings, the second part will then focus on a significant legal mean that the EU employs for external value promotion in its foreign trade and development policy, namely the mechanism of (rule of law) conditionality (C.). This conditionality will be analyzed in the context of two of its major fields of application in the trade and development nexus, namely the Special Incentive Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) (I.), and the Cotonou Agreement's essential elements clause and non-compliance procedure (II.). For both, an examination of the mechanism's legal background and functionality, as well as two short case studies with respect to the mechanism's actual application, will be provided.
B. Legal Imperatives for Rule of Law Promotion in EU
Foreign Policy I. EU Foreign Policy as a Purely Political Sphere?
The Particularity of Foreign Policy
At first glance, an assertion of the EU's rule of law promotion in foreign policy as a process extensively influenced by legal imperatives appears to have a natural antagonist, best referred to as the "particularity of foreign policy" 11 -a phenomenon that denotes a certain detachment of the sphere of foreign policy from internal (in particular constitutional) legal determination and control, often to be observed in western constitutional democracies.
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Such exceptional status of foreign policy is usually reasoned with the particularly political nature of foreign policy -conceived as being highly complex and difficult to predict, in constant need of confidentiality, expert knowledge, compromise, political flexibility, and spontaneous decision-making. Only a certain detachment from legal constraints would, therefore, not hinder foreign policy's effectiveness in the context of largely power-driven international relations.
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Approaches of (a certain) particularity can be well-observed in, for example, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America or Germany, referring to it with terms such as "theorie de l'acte de gouvernement", "political question doctrine/crown prerogative", "acts of [S]tate doctrine" or "weiter Ermessensspielraum in Angelegenheiten des Auswärtigen". Regardless of the general question of whether the exceptional status of foreign policy is (still) a fitting approach in light of the increasing relevance and impacts of international relations within domestic legal spheres and the consequential need for legitimization, 15 such an exceptional status is, however, not an accurate description of the EU's constitutional structure when it comes to the trade and development nexus. Quite the contrary holds true: EU foreign trade and development policy is to be considered a field profoundly permeated by the law.
This legal permeation can be well-observed in two aspects. The first aspect is, as will be shown below, the density of EU primary law that establishes substantive legal standards on the strategic orientation and direction of the EU's foreign (trade and development) policy. 16 The second aspect is that, with respect to foreign (trade and development) policy, 17 -with the CJEU indeed making use of these powers, frequently subjecting acts within the field to quite a high level of scrutiny. This applies not only in terms of EU law's allocation of competences and procedural matters 19 but also in terms of substantive legal requirements. 20 Accordingly, the law is anything but absent when it comes to the EU's (promotion of the rule of law in) foreign trade and development policy; as a matter of fact, the law widely determines and controls this policy, as will be elaborated further below.
II. The EU's Legal Obligation to Promote the Rule of Law Abroad
As indicated above, under EU primary law, the EU and its organs are not free to design its foreign policy and conduct its activities in the external sphere as they (politically) please. Instead, they have to comply with certain substantive requirements in EU primary law. 21 This includes an obligation to promote the rule of law abroad. With respect to the foreign trade and development policy, EU primary law establishes the relevant standards (on rule of law promotion) in Arts. The question as to what extent the EU might be obliged under international law to promote the rule of law in its foreign policy is not subject to this assessment; on this issue see Vedder, supra note 16, 140-141.
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Article 21 TEU reads: "(1) The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. (1), 209 (2) TFEU in this regard do not substantially add to Art. 21 TEU. However, they do (explicitly) repeat, refer back to, or incorporate its normative content and clarify its full applicability to the external dimensions of the common commercial policy (trade) and international development cooperation.
As an introductory provision to Title V of the TEU ("General Provisions on the Union's External Action"), Art. 21 TEU establishes a framework of guiding principles and objectives concerning the EU's external action ("the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement", Art. 21 (1) 23 These guiding principles and objectives comprise, among others, the rule of law, explicitly referred to in Art. 21 (1), (2) TEU.
The reference to the rule of law in Art. 21 TEU unfolds its relevance as a guiding principle in EU foreign policy in two dimensions. First, it constitutes the basic idea that the EU and its organs have to comply with the rule of law, not only when acting internally but also when acting externally. However, Art. 21 TEU is not restricted to such a requirement to respect the rule of law when acting externally. 24 Secondly, it also demands from the EU and its organs to promote the rule of law abroad, meaning to globally strengthen and support it beyond its own territory and jurisdiction ("which it seeks to advance in the wider world", Art. 21 (2) TEU). 25 This dimension, which is of specific relevance here, becomes This first and foremost follows from its explicit wording ("shall be guided", "shall seek", "shall pursue", "shall work for"). 
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The case did not concern the particular issue of Art. 21 TEU as a legal guiding principle for the promotion of the rule of law abroad directly but instead dealt with the construction of CJEU jurisdiction in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (where such jurisdiction is principally excluded, Art. 24 (1) TEU, Art. 275 TFEU). However, in its findings, the ECJ reasoned the necessity of an effective judicial remedy even with respect to EU operational actions outside of the EU (in this case, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina), inter alia, with a reference to the rule of law demands of Art. 21 TEU, and with that made Art. 21 TEU a normative standard against which EU external actions were legally measured. The judgment reads: Ibid., para. 100. 33 Ibid., para. 286.
c. (Procedural) Consequences and Relativity
The direction to promote the rule of law in EU foreign policy laid down in Art. 21 TEU, therefore, is not to be considered optional but establishes a legal obligation for the EU and its organs.
Accordingly, being part of the EU primary law, Art. 21 TEU can also be made a standard of judicial review before the CJEU. 34 The actual possibility to measure an act of foreign policy against the requirements of Art. 21 TEU could, for example, occur in the review of an envisaged international treaty in an Art. 218 (11) TFEU procedure or in the context of reviewing the enactment of foreign policy-related EU secondary laws, e.g. in an Art. 263 (1) TFEU annulment procedure over a Council decision on the signing of an international treaty. 35 Consequently, non-compliance with the requirement to promote the rule of law under Art. 21 TEU could ultimately render an action illegal.
However, although of legally binding nature, certain aspects have to be pointed out that put the requirements of Art. 21 TEU into perspective. 36 First, an obligation to promote the rule of law in foreign policy is necessarily a rather vague obligation, allowing for multiple paths of compliance.
37 Second, Art. 21 TEU does not only mention the rule of law but also a number of other principles to be promoted in EU foreign policy (such as human rights, democracy, European security, international peace, environmentally sustainable development, or international economic liberalization, to name but a few). Although many of these principles are compatible and even mutually reinforcing, scenarios of incoherence or conflict are possible. With Art. 21 TEU not establishing a hierarchy among its principles, this, again, suggests that Art. 21 TEU necessarily needs to allow for a certain flexibility with respect to its realization (as long as a certain consistency is ensured, Art. 21 (3) TEU). 38 And third, when it comes to judicial review, the CJEU -though far from adopting an 34 Kube, supra note 25, 26-29; Vianello, supra note 24, 228-230. Larik, 'Much More Than Tarde', supra note 6, 16-17. 37 Pech, 'Rule of Law', supra note 3, 12; Oeter, supra note 26, para. 41; Cremona, 'Structural Principles', supra note 16, 11-13. 38 Kube, supra note 25, 11. approach of a "particularity of foreign policy" 39 -grants the EU and its organs a certain margin of appreciation with respect to EU foreign policy decisions. 40 Accordingly, for the assertion of an actual violation of the obligation to promote the rule of law abroad under Art. 21 TEU, one would therefore need to assume a rather severe disregard or neglect of the rule of law in an external context.
III. The EU's Rule of Law Concept With Respect to its External Promotion
With the recognition of the EU's legal obligation to promote the rule of law in its foreign policy, a question naturally arises as to which specific concept of the rule of law applies in this external regard.
Absence of an Explicit External EU Rule of Law Concept
Answering the above question is not easy since neither EU primary law nor CJEU adjudication provides for an explicit definition or conceptual description of the rule of law contained in Art. 21 TEU.
However, with Art. 21 (1) TEU stating that the EU's actions on the international scene shall be guided by principles "which have inspired [the EU's] own creation", much suggests that the concept of the rule of law to be promoted abroad corresponds to the one that already applies within the EU. 41 Respectively, in its recent (aforementioned) judgment of CFSP, the ECJ has also implied this comparability of the two rule of law conceptions when, in the same sentence, the Court referred to the EU's rule of law principle in internal and external dimensions without making any conceptual distinctions: "In that regard, it must be noted that, as is apparent from both Article 2 TEU, which is included in the common provisions Accordingly, answering the question as to which specific concept of the rule of law has to be promoted by the EU in its external actions requires outlining the sophisticated concept of the rule of law that has developed within the EU legal order (2.).
Subsequently, this section shall assess whether EU foreign policy actually meets this (rather sophisticated) internal concept when promoting the rule of law abroad (3.).
The (Internal) EU Rule of Law
Generally, the concept of the rule of law can best be described as a set of principles organizing the relationship between a community and its governing institutions aiming at the subjection of power to law 43 -namely the principles of legality, a public monopoly of power, the supremacy of the law, the separation of powers, effective judicial remedies, and legitimacy. 44 Mainly developed in the course of the struggle over the establishment of governmental powers in the In its traditional form, the rule of law can be divided into six core principles. First, a community must be organized by general, clear, public and accessible, prospective, and predictive laws, being equally applied, instead of being ruled arbitrarily, in the sense of random individual decisions prone to unrestrained passion, bias, prejudice etc. (legality). Second, the right and power to enforce compliance with the law must lie with the public governing institutions and not with private actors (public monopoly of power). Third, the governing institutions themselves must be bound by the law (supremacy of the law). Fourth, the power of the governing institutions must be separated into independent branches, establishing checks and balances among them (separation of powers). Fifth, accessible, independent, effective, and fair mechanisms to settle legal disputes must exist, in particular allowing the governed community to review the exercise of governmental power (effective judicial remedies). Sixth, the governing institutions, in particular with respect to the making, applying, enforcing, and interpreting of the law, must be legitimized by the governed community itself (legitimacy). Westphalian Nation-States of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, 45 the rule of law, however, can, as a basic concept, be applied to any legal order that features public governance functions 46 -such as, for example, the EU. As famously stated in the CJEU's early "Les Verts" decision, the EU legal order is a community based on the rule of law.
47 Among other principles (namely respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities), the rule of law also is explicitly mentioned as one of the EU's fundamental principles 48 in Art. 2 TEU, forming part of the EU primary law. Accordingly, the subjection of governmental power to law, essentially to be accomplished by the abovenamed six core principles, constitutes a supreme legal imperative within the EU legal order ("the rule of law is the source of fully justiciable principles applicable within the EU legal system" 49 ). Therefore, the rule of law legally binds and limits However, beyond this quite widely accepted basis, much theoretical dispute over the rule of law's particular further content needs to be considered unsettled. Definitions range from purely formal to quite substantive approaches; formal definitions again being separated into thinner (demanding governance by general, clear, prospective, predictive, and equally applied laws) and thicker (additionally requiring the governing institutions to be bound and limited by the law as well as by a separation of powers and a certain level all EU organs and institutions with respect to their exercise of governmental powers, be it in administrative, judicial, or legislative matters.
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In need of an operationalization within the EU, the rule of law has experienced a broad and detailed concretization of its principles and subprinciples (Werner Schroeder fittingly speaks of a "conceptual puzzle" This is demonstrated not only by EU organs' treaty practice but also by the EU's internal strategy documents with respect to the rule of law promotion in the trade and development nexus (see below a.-d.). It also points out that: "The structure of government and the prerogatives of the different powers shall be founded on rule of law, which shall entail in particular effective and accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal system guaranteeing equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject to the law." An even more explicit documentation of the EU's sophisticated concept of the rule of law with respect to its external promotion in the trade and development nexus can already be found in the EU Commission's early 1998 pre-Cotonou Agreement communication: "Democratisation, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European Union and the ACP States". 70 The communication emphasizes elements such as the limitation of governmental power through the requirement of legality, a public monopoly of power, the separation of powers, effective judicial remedies, and governmental legitimacy: "The primacy of the law is a fundamental principle of any democratic system seeking to foster and promote rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural. This entails means of recourse enabling individual citizens to defend their rights. The principle of placing limitations on the power of the State is best served by a representative government drawing its authority from the sovereignty of the people. The principle must shape the structure of the State and the prerogatives of the various powers. It implies, for example; a legislature respecting and giving full effect to human rights and fundamental freedoms; an independent judiciary; effective and accessible means of legal recourse; a legal system guaranteeing equality before the law; a prison system respecting the human person; a police force at the service of the law; an effective executive enforcing the law and capable of establishing the social and economic conditions necessary for life in society. 71 Legality means the existence of clear-cut rules that are applied to all citizens without discrimination. It is reflected in: an appropriate constitutional, legislative and regulatory system; Ibid., 4-5. 72 Ibid., 6.
capacities and the existence of supervisory bodies acquire their full significance. This is a long-term process affecting both the structure of the State and its administration and the constitution of a democratic culture enabling the different social forces to interact and strengthen each other. The same level of sophistication with respect to the rule of law conception can be found in the joint 2017 "European Consensus on Development". 78 The Consensus again enumerates for the external sphere much of what is considered the EU's rule of law concept internally, putting a particular emphasis on the existence of institutional checks and balances, governmental legitimacy, and the access to effective judicial remedies: "Good governance, democracy and the rule of law are vital for sustainable development. The rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of all fundamental rights. Effective governance institutions and systems that are responsive to public needs deliver essential services and promote inclusive growth, while inclusive political processes ensure that citizens can hold public officials to account at all levels. The EU and its Member States will promote accountable and transparent institutions, [...]. They will promote 76 Ibid., Annex, No. 4 (Targeted support to justice systems). The 2017 European Consensus on Development is a political, non-legally binding joint statement by the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission with the purpose, as per para. 6, "to provide the framework for a common approach to development policy that will be applied by the EU institutions and the Member States while fully respecting each other's distinct roles and competences" and to "guide the action of EU institutions and Member States in their cooperation with all developing countries". independent and impartial courts, and support the provision of fair justice, including access to legal assistance. They will support capacity building for strong institutions and multi-level governance […] . 79 The EU and its Member States will foster efficient, transparent, independent, open and accountable justice systems and will promote access to justice for all -in particular the poor and persons in vulnerable situations." 80 Interestingly, the Consensus also explicitly links its efforts of rule of law promotion to the above-discussed obligations under Art. 21 TEU:
"In line with the objectives set out in Article 21 (2) TEU, development policy also contributes, inter alia, to supporting democracy, the rule of law [...].
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The EU and its Member States will promote the universal values of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights for all, because they are preconditions for sustainable development and stability, across the full range of partnerships and instruments in all situations and in all countries, including through development action." Ibid., para. 61. 80 Ibid., para. 63.
Ibid., para. 11. 82 Ibid., para. 6. 83 Ibid., para. 5; see also chapters 1 and 5, "The EU's Response to the 2030 Agenda" and "The EU as a Force for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda" respectively. 
C. Legal Mechanism of Rule of Law Conditionality in EU Foreign Policy
As has been stated above, this article aims to emphasize the legal dimensions of the rule of law promotion in EU foreign policy.
So far, it has been established that EU foreign (trade and development) policy is not a particular and legally detached, but instead a widely legally determined field and that Art. 21 TEU actually legally obliges the EU to promote the rule of law in its external actions. It has also been shown that the concept of the rule of law promoted abroad corresponds to the rule of law concept applied within the EU.
However, it is not only the if but also the how of external rule of law promotion that holds a legal dimension (and is organized by legal means). This legal permeation is particularly well-illustrated by the EU's rule of law conditionality mechanism -a key legal instrument in this regard, especially when it comes to the promotion of the rule of law in the foreign trade and development nexus.
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Rule of law conditionality in this context is to be understood as a mechanism that puts benefits granted by the EU in the international sphere (trade preferences, development cooperation, etc.) under the legal condition of a certain behavior or deliverable of a third State, namely the domestic implementation and upholding of a rule of law-coherent legal order (so-called carrot-and-stick policy). 87 The EU employs the legal mechanism of conditionality to fulfill its external Art. 21 TEU obligations quite extensively, not only via unilateral/ autonomous instruments but also in its bilateral/contractual relationships. 88 Two manifestations of the EU's rule of law conditionality in the trade and development nexus are particularly well-suited to illustrate its legal functioning, namely the Special Incentive Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) (I.), and the Cotonou Agreement's essential elements clause and non-compliance procedure (II.). The GSP+ mechanism forms part of the autonomous instruments, while the Cotonou Agreement's essential elements clause and non-compliance procedure form part of the contractual relationships.
I. GSP+
This approach is currently based on the GSP Regulation 90 which explicitly aims to achieve "the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the TEU" (that refers back to Art. 21 TEU). 91 The GSP Regulation also states that:
"By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be reinvested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies."
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To this end, the preferential status is granted to all eligible developing countries, namely low-income or lower-middle income developing countries as listed in Annex I of the GSP Regulation.
However, apart from this general scheme, the GSP Regulation additionally establishes a special incentive scheme (the GSP+), offering extended trade benefits under certain conditions.
The most significant condition for admittance to the GSP+ is that the respective developing country has ratified (without reservations) and effectively implemented a list of 27 international conventions on core human and labor rights, environmental protection, and good governance, listed in Annex VIII of the Regulation. This condition also remains effective after admittance. If an admitted country seriously and systemically violates its obligations or terminates a convention, the GSP+ preferences are suspended or withdrawn. 93 The burden of proof with respect to the compliance with the GSP+ conditions rests with the beneficiary developing country. 94 essential sub-element of the rule of law principles of legality and the supremacy of the law. Second, Annex VIII demands the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 95 (ICCPR) whose guarantees, although in the form of individual human rights, are closely interlinked and partly overlap with the rule of law -in particular with respect to Arts. 14, 15, 25 and 26 ICCPR, establishing obligations regarding e.g. equality before the law, access to justice and effective judicial remedies, fair trial, the prohibition of retroactivity as well as certain basic aspects of democratic participation.
The unilateral GSP+ mechanism might therefore not be considered the EU's most significant rule of law conditionality instrument; it does, however, add to the EU's overall approach of rule of law promotion through legal means. ). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 100 which monitors and measures the development of governance factors such as democracy, market economy, and also the rule of law, provides some noteworthy data on Sri Lanka in this regard.
When inspecting the data (see below), it turns out that the EU withdrew GSP+ benefits in 2009 at the beginning of a significant decline in the level of the rule of law in the Sri Lankan legal order. Then, after Sri Lanka achieved a significant recovery in the rule of law level in 2016, GSP+ benefits were regranted in 2017. Although it appears difficult to prove a direct causality between Sri Lanka's desire for GSP+ benefits and the recovery of the Sri Lankan rule of law, the correlation of these developments is quite remarkable. The aforementioned rule of law conditionality mechanism of the Cotonou Agreement is enshrined in two central provisions, namely Arts. 9 and 96 Cotonou Agreement.
Although the Arts. 9 and 96 Cotonou Agreement theoretically apply mutually, their obvious purpose -considering the dissimilar relationship of the EU and the ACP States, with the Cotonou Agreement essentially being an instrument of EU development cooperation -is to establish a (rule of law) monitoring mechanism to be predominantly used by the EU.
Art. 9 Cotonou Agreement establishes the treaty parties' obligation to implement and uphold a rule of law-coherent domestic legal order as an "essential element" of the overall contractual relationship. Differing from the GSP+ mechanism, rule of law conditionality within the Cotonou Agreement therefore does not work as a unilateral (or autonomous) instrument but as part of a contractual relationship within an international treaty. Art. 9 Cotonou Agreement ("Essential elements regarding human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and fundamental element regarding good governance") reads: "1. Cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centered on the human person […] . Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development. The Parties reaffirm that democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Democratic principles are universally recognised principles underpinning the organisation of the State to ensure the legitimacy of its authority, the legality of its actions reflected in its constitutional, legislative and regulatory system, and the existence of participatory mechanisms.
[…] The structure of government and the prerogatives of the different powers shall be founded on rule of law, which shall entail in particular effective and accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal system guaranteeing equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject to the law. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, shall […] constitute the essential elements of this Agreement. 3. In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decisionmaking procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption. […] If the consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation is refused or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them no longer prevail. (b) The term 'cases of special urgency' shall refer to exceptional cases of particularly serious and flagrant violation of one of the essential elements referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, that require an immediate reaction.
[…] (c) The 'appropriate measures' referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement. It is understood that suspension would be a measure of last resort.
[…]" Based on a careful reading, Art. 96 Cotonou Agreement does not only provide for a consultation procedure if a party to the agreement is not fulfilling its rule of law obligations under Art. 9 Cotonou Agreement (namely the obligation to implement and uphold a rule of law-coherent domestic legal order) but, more significantly, also explicitly allows for appropriate measures to be taken, in accordance with international law, if the consultations do not result in the cessation of the violations.
Appropriate measures in accordance with international law, meaning in accordance with Art. 60 In April 2010, military unrest took place in Guinea-Bissau, in the course of which the Guinea-Bissauan Prime Minister was arrested and eventually left the country while the coup's main instigators were appointed to high-ranking military positions. Furthermore, arbitrary detentions and illegal conduct of the acting security forces occurred and looting took place. 115 The significant interference with the Guinea-Bissauan constitutional order by this illegal For an overview on the Guinea-Bissau procedures in particular see also ibid. military seizure of power gave rise to multiple rule of law concerns, in particular with respect to legality, the public monopoly of power, the supremacy of the law, and the separation of powers, as well as to the legitimacy of the governing institution.
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As a response, in January 2011, the EU launched consultations under Art. 96 Cotonou Agreement with the Guinea-Bissauan authorities, considering the developments "a serious and evident breach of essential elements set out in Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement". 117 However, the consultations, until their conclusion in July 2011, did not resolve the situation.
Consequently, the EU, as an appropriate measure under Art. 96 Cotonou Agreement, suspended large parts of its ongoing budget support as well as other development cooperation within Guinea-Bissau and started to channel the remaining funding directly to the population through NGOs and international organizations. The suspension was scheduled to end in July 2012. (1), 209 (2) TFEU) legally oblige the EU to promote the rule of law in its foreign trade and development policy. To fulfill this obligation, the EU employs, as a key instrument, the legal mechanism of rule of law conditionality, not only via unilateral/autonomous instruments but also in its bilateral/contractual relationships. The EU's foreign trade and development policy can, therefore, be considered as a process extensively determined and organized by means of law.
Four distinct conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the functioning and development of the EU foreign trade and development policy, with respect to rule of law promotion, can neither be understood nor described without due consideration being afforded to, first and foremost, its legal grounding and permeation.
Second, the EU's hegemonial aspirations of exporting its values, are, in principle, not open to political debate. Instead, these aspirations derive from and are decided by the constitutional legal imperative of the EU treaties.
Third, the EU's choice to fulfill its foreign policy obligations by combining its leading position in the trade and development nexus with legal means of rigid 121 Council Decision (EU) 2015/541, OJ 2015 L 88; see Council of the European Union, Press Release, EU to Resume Cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, 11664/14 (14 July 2014) "The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and the EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, said: 'We are indeed very satisfied with this decision since it enables the EU to support the newly elected authorities on their path towards the reconstruction and stabilisation of the state by helping them rapidly to ensure vital state functions and provide basic social services to the population.' While today's decision suspends measures limiting EU cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, the EU expects that the Guinea-Bissauan authorities make every effort to fulfil their commitments to the EU as a matter of priority. These undertakings were made during consultations with the EU in 2011 and concern for instance the reform of the security sector, the renewal of the military hierarchy and the fight against impunity."; see also conditionality (as opposed to e.g. diplomatic persuasion) demonstrates a quite firm commitment to promoting the rule of law abroad. With this combination, the EU can be seen as making a rather uncompromising use of its capacities as a normative power.
Fourth and final, the legal entrenchment of the above-described values and their promotion affords a certain predictability of the future direction of EU foreign policy -a welcome assurance in a currently quite unstable and unpredictable global international order.
